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Vagueness, Inconsistency and Less
Respect for Charter Rights of
Accused at the Supreme
Court in 2012-2013
Don Stuart*
I. INTRODUCTION
I have often lauded the Supreme Court of Canada for achieving a
much better balance than politicians between the rights of accused and
society’s interests in enforcing tough criminal laws. The Court’s recent
record, however, gives cause for alarm respecting issues of undue vagueness and inconsistency, and shows diminishing resolve in protecting the
Charter1 rights of accused. In this context the Court never speaks these
days, as did Chief Justice Dickson, of courts being the “guardians of the
Constitution.2 The Court has also conspicuously avoided even addressing
some Charter issues important to accused.
My main exhibits are the Court’s controversial rulings in Mabior,3
Maybin,4 Prokofiew5 and Nedelcu,6 with A. (D.I.)7 and S. (N.)8 invoked in
aid to show rampantly inconsistent approaches to judicial notice.

*
Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this paper first
appeared in my writings in the Criminal Reports, published by Carswell Thomson Reuters.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). The role was
recently relied on by McLachlin C.J.C. in asserting Métis land rights in Manitoba Metis Federation
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 13, 2013 SCC 13 (S.C.C.).
3
R. v. Mabior, [2012] S.C.J. No. 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mabior”].
4
R. v. Maybin, [2012] S.C.J. No. 24, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Maybin”].
5
R. v. Prokofiew, [2012] S.C.J. No. 49, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prokofiew”].
6
R. v. Nedelcu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nedelcu”].
7
R. v. A. (D.I.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 5, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 149 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A. (D.I.)”].
8
R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “S. (N.)”].
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II. R. V. MABIOR (HIV DISCLOSURE)9
This carefully justified unanimous decision achieves a compromise
built on refining the majority decision of Cory J. in R. v. Cuerrier10 that
fraud will only vitiate consent under section 265(3) of the Criminal Code11
in cases of assault and sexual assault where the fraud involves a significant
risk of serious harm. The Court has again sensibly rejected the approach of
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Cuerrier that any fraud to induce consent will result
in criminality. So proven lies such as “I love you”, “Trust me”, “I will be
faithful” or “I will buy you a fur coat” (the extravagant example that engaged the Court in Cuerrier) will not result in criminal sanctions. In
Mabior, the Chief Justice decided that consent to sexual intercourse with
an HIV-positive accused will be not be vitiated by the fraud of nondisclosure where there is no realistic possibility of transmission of HIV
because of a low viral count AND a condom was used. The first obvious
vagueness in the approach is that there is no definition provided of what
constitutes a low viral count, which will clearly therefore require expert
testimony in every case, a situation the Court expressly sought to avoid.
The Mabior ruling has already lead to strident criticism in the media
from two very different interest groups. Those who see HIV-positive
persons as a vulnerable and marginalized group cannot see why nondisclosure of HIV status where there is a low viral count should result in
serious criminality given that anti-retroviral treatment results in an 89 per
cent to 96 per cent reduction in the general low risk of HIV transmission
for one sexual act of 1 in 1,250.12 These advocates argue that any forced
disclosure of HIV status will discourage HIV testing and inhibit sexual
autonomy inherent in truthful but inhibiting disclosures such as “I am
HIV-positive but the risk of transmission is low so the risk is very small.”
It is also not clear to these critics why the Court decided that the only
way an HIV-positive individual engaging in sexual activity can avoid
serious criminality for non-disclosure of a low viral count is to wear a
condom. In contrast, the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s approach in the court
below to the anti-retroviral advances was not to criminalize non-disclosure
of a low viral count OR any case of non-disclosure where a condom was

9
Compare the more favourable comment by Janine Benedet, “Fraud Vitiating Consent to
Sexual Activity after Mabior and C. (D.)” (2012) 96 C.R. (6th) 33.
10
[1998] S.C.J. No. 64, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cuerrier”].
11
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
12
See data referred to at paras. 97, 100 and 101 of Mabior, supra, note 3.
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used. So the Supreme Court is much tougher and broader in its approach to
criminalization.
A different criticism is advanced by advocates for sexual assault
complainants. Since the approach to consent has long been established as
subjective, surely, it is argued, the serious life-threatening risk of HIV
transmission, however low, should always be disclosed to allow for informed consent. It is clear that in most of the HIV cases before the
courts, the complainants have testified that they would never have consented had they known about the HIV status. These advocates would no
doubt welcome the 80 per cent risk reduction promised by the Supreme
Court’s requirement that condoms always be used.13
The vehemence and strength of the arguments from these opposed
camps suggest that the Supreme Court had to arrive at a compromise on
the present state of medical knowledge and that it could not satisfy all
competing concerns. Yet the language the Court uses is glaringly inconsistent with its conclusions. Chief Justice McLachlin, undoubtedly our most
powerful and prolific Chief Justice in Canadian history, is eloquent in justifying the Court’s approach. She relies on the rule of law requirement of
clear notice of criminality (“Condemning people for conduct that they
could not have reasonably known was criminal is Kafkaesque and anathema to our notions of justice”14), on the need to avoid criminal laws being
too broad and on Charter values of “equality, autonomy, liberty, privacy
and human dignity”.15 However, it is hard to see how any of these notions
pointed to the broad criminalizing solution the Court actually adopted.
The current rhetoric of Charter values (“Charter lite” would be a better term) is particularly disquieting if one believes in the rule of law. This
“Charter values” rather than “rights” discourse is growing increasingly
unruly and apparently does not include the presumption of innocence and
fair trial values. These “Charter lite” assertions bypass the rigour of actually meeting established tests for Charter breaches. In the case of equality
rights, after anxious debate16 the majority of the Court has determined
that the controlling test of discrimination to establish a section 15 breach
does NOT involve having to point to an effect on dignity. So why is
“dignity” relevant to Charter “values”?

13
14
15
16

Id., at para. 98.
Id., at para. 14
Id., at para. 45.
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 2013 SCC 5 (S.C.C.).
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These broad principles of no retrospectivity, avoiding broad criminal
sanctions and Charter values were also not addressed in the ruling of the
Chief Justice for the 6-3 majority in R. v. A. (J.)17 that advance consent to
sexual conduct while unconscious is not a valid consent in law. The uncontradicted evidence in that case was that the adult complainant freely
and consciously consented to erotic asphyxiation involving anal penetration during transitory unconsciousness.

III. R. V. MAYBIN (INTERVENING CAUSE)18
Maybin is the first Supreme Court case to fully confront the issue of
how courts should decide whether an intervening cause breaks the chain
of causation in the case of offences where an element to be proved is the
causing of a consequence. The end result is that the Court widens the
approach to causation and the already excessively wide net of manslaughter.19 In my view, it was unwise to leave the test of intervening
cause untethered.
In the court below, the B.C. Court of Appeal divided on whether the
test for intervening cause breaking the chain of causation should be that
of no reasonable forseeability or whether there was an intentional act of
an independent actor. It was expected that the Supreme Court would
adopt one of these or another approach. Instead, the Supreme Court
decided that neither test is to be preferred and that both are merely
analytical aids and do not alter the Smithers/Nette test of whether the
accused was a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death.
In focusing on the language of “significant contributing cause”
the Supreme Court glosses over the complexity of R. v. Nette,20 where
Arbour J. for the 5-4 majority preferred the language of significant
contributing cause but indicated that terminology was up to the trial
judge, leaving it open for resort to the language in R. v. Smithers21 of a
contributing test outside the de minimis range. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
for the minority on the law in Nette objected to the “significant”
17

[2011] S.C.J. No. 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.).
See critical comments by Ben Snow, “A Cause for Concern: Incoherence in the Doctrine
of Intervening Cause” (2012) 92 C.R. (6th) 241 [hereinafter “Snow”] and Gerry Ferguson,
“Causation and the Mens Rea for Manslaughter: A Lethal Combination” (2013) 99 C.R. (6th) 351
[hereinafter “Ferguson”].
19
See Ferguson, id., for a careful analysis of why our manslaughter law is far too wide.
20
[2001] S.C.J. No. 75, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nette”].
21
[1977] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smithers”].
18
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adjective as unnecessarily narrowing the Smithers test. The Court in
Maybin ought to have made it crystal clear that it was opting for the test
of the significant contributing test, as did Doherty J.A. in R. v. Talbot.22
Arguably, the Court should have rested content with the test for all cause
issues and not have gotten mired in issues of intervening cause.
The Court, however, went further. In doing so, it is unfortunate that
the Court in Maybin did not adopt a binding test for when a cause is intervening to break the chain of causation. “Analytical aids” that are
helpful but not determinative leave trial counsel and trial judges at sea.
The same ambiguity arises in the jurisprudential approach in R. v. Stone23
identifying three non-determinative factors for distinguishing the sane
automatism defence from a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.
In Nette Arbour J. said that it was not necessary to address the factual
and legal cause issues separately, but this is what the Court does in Maybin.
Yet neither the reasonable foreseeable nor independent actor test is to be
determinative on the issue of legal causation. Explain that to a jury or to
law students!
The Court furthermore toughens the reasonable foreseeable approach
to one of reasonable foreseeability of a risk rather than of the particular
intervention.24 Here, reasonable foresight of someone intervening to beat
up the victim sufficed to hold the original actor criminally responsible for
the death. With Finch C.J.B.C. in dissent in the court below, this is hard
to find on the evidence before the Court. The Court notes that this
approach is consistent with the fault requirement for unlawful act
manslaughter — reasonable foresight of non-trivial bodily harm adopted
in R. v. Creighton.25 It is not clear how this analysis will work in nonhomicide cases where subjective mens rea is required. Presumably in
murder cases these intervening act cases will be resolved not on Maybin
but on the Charter mens rea requirement of actual foresight of the
likelihood of death established in R. v. Martineau.26

22
23
24
25
26

[2007] O.J. No. 427, 44 C.R. (6th) 176 (Ont. C.A.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 27, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.).
See Snow, supra, note 18.
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
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The independent act approach is also pragmatically changed to one
where this does not absolve the accused where the act of another was a
direct result of the accused’s act.27 How is this to apply to more difficult
cases such as where the victim of a minor assault is taken by ambulance
to hospital for a precautionary check and death is caused by dangerous
driving of the ambulance driver, bad treatment by an intervening good
Samaritan or negligent medical treatment at the hospital? The Court
points to existing Criminal Code provisions declaring that some of these
intervening causes do not break the chain of causation (for example,
section 225 respecting improper treatment applied in “good faith”).
The Court does not address whether fundamental principles of justice
under section 7 of the Charter should be applied to prevent such clearly
excessive extensions of the law of manslaughter. In Nette, Arbour J.
referred to legal causation reflecting “fundamental principles of criminal
justice such as the principle that the morally innocent should not be
punished”.28 Hopefully this is not the last word on intervening cause and
prosecutorial discretion will be exercised with restraint where multiple
causes are at play in cases more sympathetic than Maybin.

IV. CHARTER AVERSE
In some cases the current Supreme Court is conspicuously ducking
rather than guarding Charter standards.
In R. v. Ryan29 the Court indicated that it was not the role of the
Court to fill gaps in what Parliament has done — in that case in its codification of the defence of self-defence. The Court overlooks that in
R. v. Ruzic30 it held that defences required no more deference to Charter
scrutiny that when reviewing fault requirements and further declared that
moral involuntariness was a Charter standard under section 7. How that
plays out for abused persons who act in agonizing situations was regrettably left unaddressed in Ryan.
In R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun,31 involving toxic psychosis induced by
drugs, the Supreme Court rejected the defence of extreme intoxication to

27

See Snow, supra, note 18.
Nette, supra, note 20, at para. 45, quoted in Maybin, supra, note 4, at para. 16.
29
[2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3 (S.C.C.). See Criminal Reports comments by Stephen
Coughlan, Archie Kaiser, and Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton.
30
[2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.).
31
[2011] S.C.J. No. 58, 2011 SCC 58 (S.C.C.).
28
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a charge of aggravated assault by simply applying section 33.1 of the
Criminal Code. In enacting section 33.1 Parliament purported to remove
the Court’s R. v. Daviault32 defence of extreme intoxication “akin to
insanity or automatism” from offences of general intent which affect
bodily integrity. The Court in Bouchard-Lebrun simply noted the lack of
Charter challenge. Since the Court’s majority decision in Daviault was
squarely based on the view that this limited and rare defence was
required by the Charter, it seems far too deferential and meek for the
Court to have avoided the Charter issue in this way. The Court should
have ordered a new hearing to decide whether the Court is still
committed to the Daviault principles it declared 15 years ago.
I turn now to consider the Charter rulings in Prokofiew and Nedelcu.
Both the key majority judgments were written by Justice Michael
Moldaver. Justice Moldaver is certainly to be commended for his hard
work since his appointment in already producing many judgments for the
Court in the field of criminal law. He brings considerable criminal law
expertise and experience to the Court but he has never been known as a
Charter enthusiast.33 In these two Charter judgments he has left too much
to the discretion of trial judges and has unnecessarily diminished Charter
rights for accused. Both judgments unfortunately necessitate careful
parsing and analysis to reveal their reality.

V. R. V. PROKOFIEW34 (COMMENTS ON THE ACCUSED’S
SILENCE AT TRIAL)
Section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act35 has long provided that
“[t]he failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband of that
person, to testify shall not be made the subject of comment by the judge
or by counsel for the prosecution”.
The Supreme Court’s divided majority opinion in Prokofiew has read
down section 4(6) to allow instructions on trial silence, but has left this to
the largely unfettered discretion of trial judges. This has further and
unnecessarily weakened the right to silence.

32

[1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”].
See Michael Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials: Masters of a System They Are Meant to
Serve” (2006) 32 C.R. (6th) 316 and my reply, “The Charter is a Living Tree Not a Weed to be
Stunted – Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 280.
34
Supra, note 5.
35
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
33
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1. The Courts Below
The trial judge, relying on dicta of Sopinka J. for the Supreme Court
in R. v. Crawford36 and R. v. Noble,37 concluded that section 4(6) of the
Canada Evidence Act prohibited him from telling the jury that they could
not use the accused’s silence at trial as evidence against him. The trial
judge made it clear that, but for his understanding of the prohibition in
section 4(6), he would have given a remedial instruction. The jury convicted the appellant and his co-accused. The accused appealed, inter alia,
arguing that section 4(6) was unconstitutional.
The appeal was dismissed by Doherty J.A. on behalf of a unanimous
five-person panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal.38 Justices Feldman,
MacPherson, Blair and Juriansz concurred. The court held that Sopinka J.’s
comments were obiter and should not be followed given earlier pronouncements from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held that
section 4(6) did not preclude comments not prejudicial to the accused
and permitted a trial judge to tell a jury that an accused who does not
testify is exercising his or her constitutional right and that no adverse
inference can be drawn from that failure to testify. However, the Court of
Appeal held, on consideration of the entirety of the instructions on the
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, that this was a case for
the curative proviso under section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.
The jury would have to understand that guilt had to be established on the
evidence and that the accused’s silence at trial could not be used to infer
the accused’s guilt.
2. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The 5-4 division in the
Supreme Court is importantly not just over the application of the curative
proviso. The majority agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that this
was a case for the curative proviso. The minority judgment of Fish J.
reads as if he thought he was writing for a majority. This seems
apparent from the enigmatic and opaque opening paragraphs of the
majority judgment of Moldaver J. (Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and
Karakatsanis JJ. concurring) as follows:
36
37
38

[1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.).
[1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Noble”].
[2010] O.J. No. 2498, 100 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.).
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Largely for the reasons given by Doherty J.A., I would dismiss
Mr. Prokofiew’s further appeal to this Court. I have had the benefit of
reading the reasons of my colleague Justice Fish and I agree with much
of his analysis. Where I disagree with him is in the result. I will explain
our disagreement and why the appeal should be dismissed, but before
doing so, I will address the matters on which my colleague and I agree
— albeit with some additional observations.39

Although it is the majority judgment that is binding on how judges
are to proceed in future cases, in order to understand what the Court
decided it will be helpful to first consider what Fish J. decided on
section 4(6) and the right to silence.
3. Minority in the Result
According to Fish J. (McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel and Cromwell JJ.
concurring), the Court of Appeal for Ontario correctly held that section 4(6)
prohibits comments prejudicial to the accused but not the remedial instruction requested by defence counsel and contemplated by the judge.
Dicta to the contrary by Sopinka J. were indeed obiter and should not be
followed given earlier Supreme Court judgments.
Noble had established that a trier of fact may not draw an adverse inference from the accused’s failure to testify and that the accused’s silence
at trial may not be treated as evidence of guilt. To do so would violate the
presumption of innocence and the right to silence. It would to that extent
and for that reason shift the burden of proof to the accused, turning the
accused’s constitutional right to silence into a “snare and a delusion”.40
The Crown had argued that Noble should be overruled but Fish J. held
that there was no persuasive reason to do so. In his view Noble is a recent
and important precedent regarding a fundamental constitutional principle; the decision was constitutionally mandated and had not proven
unworkable in practice. Nothing of significance had occurred since 1997
to cause the Court to reconsider its decision. On the issue of directions in
jury trials, the minority offered the following advice:
In short, s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act does not prohibit an
affirmation by the trial judge of the accused’s right to silence. And, in
appropriate circumstances, an instruction that no adverse inference may

39
40

Prokofiew, supra, note 5, at paras. 1-2.
Noble, supra, note 37, at para. 72.
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be drawn from the silence of the accused at trial is not a prohibited
“comment” on the accused’s failure to testify within the meaning of
that provision.41
Trial judges must take care to ensure that the right to silence becomes
neither a snare nor a delusion (Noble, at para. 72). To this end,
whenever there is a “significant risk” ― as the trial judge found in this
case ― that the jury will otherwise treat the silence of the accused as
evidence of guilt, an appropriate remedial direction ought to be given to
the jury. That was not done here.42

Justice Fish concluded that the trial judge erred in law in this case in failing to give the jury the remedial instruction requested by defence counsel
and there was also a conceded error in admitting hearsay evidence. The
Crown had not discharged its burden on the curative proviso. This opinion on the curative proviso did not carry the Court.
4. Majority Decision
According to Moldaver J. for the majority, the Court was in agreement that section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act does not prohibit a
trial judge from affirming an accused’s right to silence. More specifically, the majority added the following remarks:
In so concluding, I should not be taken — nor do I understand my
colleague to suggest — that such an instruction must be given in every
case where an accused exercises his or her right to remain silent at trial.
Rather, it will be for the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her
discretion, to provide such an instruction where there is a realistic
concern that the jury may place evidential value on an accused’s
decision not to testify.43
In cases where the jury is given an instruction on the accused’s right to
remain silent at trial, the trial judge should, in explaining the right,
make it clear to the jury that an accused’s silence is not evidence and
that it cannot be used as a makeweight for the Crown in deciding
whether the Crown has proved its case. In other words, if, after
considering the whole of the evidence, the jury is not satisfied that the
charge against the accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,

41
42
43

Id., at para. 79.
Id., at para. 94.
Id., at para. 3 (emphasis added).
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the jury cannot look to the accused’s silence to remove that doubt and
give the Crown’s case the boost it needs to push it over the line.44

This case provided an example, the majority held, of a situation
where such an instruction would be warranted — a cutthroat defence
case where one accused testifies and points the finger at the other, while
the other exercises his right not to testify. In such cases where there is a
risk of counsel misleading the jury on a co-accused’s right to remain
silent at trial, trial judges would, held Moldaver J., do well to spell out
the governing principles and ensure that counsel’s remarks conform to
those principles. In this case remedial instruction would have been preferable. However, considering the instructions on the presumption of
reasonable doubt, this was a case for the curative proviso.
Justice Moldaver adds that it might be helpful to explain how a jury
may use a lack of contradictory evidence in deciding whether the Crown
has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt:
Juries are also told that in deciding whether the Crown has proved its
case to the criminal standard, they are to look to the whole of the
evidence — and, having done so, they may only convict if they are
satisfied, on the basis of evidence they find to be both credible and
reliable, that the Crown has established the accused’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In coming to that conclusion, a jury may not use an
accused’s silence at trial as evidence, much less evidence of guilt, and,
where appropriate, the jury should be so instructed.45
That said, in assessing the credibility and reliability of evidence upon
which the Crown can and does rely, a jury is entitled to take into
account, among other things, the fact that the evidence stands
uncontradicted, if that is the case — and the jury may be so instructed.
Of course, the fact that evidence is uncontradicted does not mean that
the jury must accept it, and an instruction to that effect should be given.46

5. Comment
The Supreme Court’s judgments do not give clear guidance to trial
judges. It is at least made clear that the majority view in Noble has been
re-asserted. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that no adverse
inference can be drawn from trial silence.
44
45
46

Id., at para. 4.
Id., at para 10.
Id., at para 11 (emphasis added).
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The Court has also read down section 4(6) to make it clear that instructions can be given to juries on this Charter principle. It was a stretch
for the Supreme Court to decide that a clearly worded statutory prohibition against “comment” does not mean what it says and permits
comments not prejudicial to accused. The Supreme Court ought to have
been forthright and declared section 4(6) unconstitutional.
What is distressingly unclear is when instructions should be given.
The only clear pronouncement from either judgment is that there must
be a direction in cutthroat defence cases like Prokofiew when defence
counsel is making hay of the silence of a co-accused. But more
generally, the majority say that an express direction is only required
when “there is a realistic concern that a jury may place evidential value
on the accused’s decision not to testify”.47 How is a trial judge to
determine that? Furthermore, the majority determines that a trial judge
can instruct the jury that the Crown evidence is uncontradicted, coupled
with the instruction that this does not mean that the jury must accept it.
That would allow an indirect and perhaps not-so-subtle comment on the
fact that an accused did not testify. Would it be appropriate where
Crown witnesses have been vigorously and effectively cross-examined?
Either of these possible instructions is now left to the largely unfettered
discretion of trial judges.
We need to avoid any inkling of the 1840 theft trial at the Old Bailey
where the trial lasted about three minutes and the jury direction was,
“Gentlemen, I suppose you have no doubt. I have none.”48
The Supreme Court has again acknowledged the fundamental right to
silence but given it no teeth.49 Opinions do differ as to the determination
that no adverse inference can be drawn from trial silence. Recall that it
was Chief Justice Lamer who lead the dissent in Noble. He expressed the
view that where there is overwhelming evidence and the accused stays
silent at trial, an adverse inference can be drawn. But once the current
Supreme Court adopted the majority position on Noble it should, in my
view, have required a direction to the jury as to that right in every case.
Of course some judges may now wish to take that position since the matter has been left to unfettered discretion. On the other hand, given the
application of the proviso in Prokofiew it is very difficult to assess when
47

Id., at para. 3.
Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2010), at 91.
49
See especially R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) (s. 7 right
to silence subsumed by the voluntary confession rule).
48
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appeal courts should reverse a trial judge who gave no instruction on the
right to silence, even in cutthroat defence cases.

VI. R. V. NEDELCU50 (USE IMMUNITY)
In essence the full Court first confirms the basic ruling of Binnie J.
for a unanimous Court in R. v. Henry51 that use immunity under section 13
of the Charter only applies where an accused gave incriminating evidence under compulsion at a prior proceeding. However, Moldaver J. for
a 6-3 majority held that the trial judge had not erred in permitting the
Crown to cross-examine the accused on civil discovery statements because the statements were not incriminating, as “incriminating evidence”
only refers to evidence the Crown could (if permitted) use in subsequent
proceeding to prove or assist in proving one or more essential elements
of the offence charged.
This effectively reversed the clear bright line approach under Henry
that previously compelled testimony is always inadmissible even if
tendered for credibility, a pragmatic decision widely applauded by judges
and commentators.
1. The Lower Courts
The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily
harm and impaired driving causing bodily harm. He took a fellow employee, P, for a motorcycle ride on company property. There was a crash. P
was not wearing a helmet and suffered permanent brain damage. The
victim and his family brought a civil suit against the accused and he was
examined for discovery. In his discovery answers on oath, the accused
indicated that he had no memory of the accident until he woke up the
next day in hospital. At the criminal trial 14 months later, he gave a detailed account of how the accident occurred. The trial judge allowed the
Crown to cross-examine on the statement as to credibility on the basis
that section 13 of the Charter did not apply to compelled discovery evidence in a civil case. The accused was not afforded the protection of
section 13 of the Charter because his situation did not meet the quid pro
50
Supra, note 6. See also the comments of Paul Calarco, “R. v. Nedelcu: Whatever Happened
to a Large and Liberal Interpretation of the Charter?” (2013) 96 C.R. (6th) 438 and Lisa Dufraimont,
“Section 13 Use Immunity After R. v. Nedlecu” (2013) 96 C.R. (6th) 431 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”].
51
[2005] S.C.J. No. 76. [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Henry”].
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quo rationale of compulsion. The accused had given his discovery evidence to further his own private interest in a civil action against him.
Relying in part on the contradictions between the accused’s two accounts, the trial judge concluded that the accused’s entire testimony
regarding the accident was unreliable. The accused was convicted and
appealed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The court, relying on Henry, held that under
section 13 of the Charter an accused’s compelled testimony on civil discovery is inadmissible at the subsequent criminal trial for purposes of
incrimination or for testing credibility. The protection was not only available where the prior testimony assists the Crown. The accused had been
compelled to testify on the examination for discovery solely for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Quid pro quo had a wider meaning than that given by
the trial judge. Any other proceeding in section 13 included royal commissions, statutory boards and tribunals, bankruptcy proceedings and
other forms of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The trial judge’s
distinction between criminal and non-criminal interrogatories was not
relevant.
2. The Supreme Court
The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the Crown appeal, set
aside the order for a new trial and restored the conviction.
According to Moldaver J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Deschamps, Abella,
Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring) section 13 of the Charter
embodies a quid pro quo: a witness who has given incriminating evidence under compulsion at a prior proceeding (the quid) is protected
from having that evidence used to incriminate him or her at a subsequent
proceeding (the quo), except in a prosecution for perjury or the giving of
contradictory evidence. Consequently, a party seeking to invoke section 13
protection must first establish that he or she provided “incriminating evidence” under compulsion at a prior proceeding. In this context
“incriminating evidence” means evidence that the Crown could use in a
subsequent proceeding, if it were permitted to do so, to prove or assist in
proving one or more of the essential elements of the offence charged.
The time to determine whether the evidence given at a prior proceeding
should be characterized as “incriminating” is when the Crown seeks to
use the evidence at a subsequent hearing.
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On its own, held Moldaver J., the accused’s discovery evidence indicating that he remembered nothing from the accident could not have
been used by the Crown to prove or assist in proving one or more of the
essential elements of the criminal charges he was facing. It was therefore
not incriminating evidence and did not trigger the protection of section 13.
In theory, if the Crown were able to prove that the accused concocted his
discovery evidence, that finding would constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt from which guilt could potentially be inferred. However, the
mere possibility that otherwise non-incriminating evidence could be converted into incriminating evidence if the Crown took added steps was not
enough to trigger the application of section 13. Moreover, the use of the
accused’s discovery evidence to test his credibility, and nothing else,
could not convert his discovery evidence into incriminating evidence.
Where evidence of an accused’s non-incriminating prior testimony is
introduced by the Crown, trial judges must provide juries with clear instructions on the use they can make of the evidence given at the prior
proceeding. In this case, unless the accused adopted his discovery testimony, the jury would be told that they could not use his discovery
evidence for its truth, but only to test his credibility. The jury would also
be told that if they were to reject the accused’s trial evidence, they could
not use that rejection to bolster the Crown’s case but would simply remove his evidence from their consideration.
Justice Moldaver suggests that trial judges will have little trouble
discerning whether evidence given by the accused as a witness in a prior
proceeding is incriminating. Where the evidence is found to be incriminating, section 13 will apply and the evidence will be inadmissible for
any purpose (other than a prosecution for perjury or giving contradictory
evidence).
Justice LeBel, with Fish and Cromwell JJ. concurring, dissented in
part. Cross-examination of the accused on his evidence given in civil
discovery infringed his right against self-incrimination and should be
excluded.
Justice LeBel spoke for the whole Court in holding that a witness
who is statutorily compellable is “compelled” to testify for the purposes
of section 13. Whereas evidence from an accused who decides to testify
is voluntary because the accused has a constitutional right not to testify,
evidence from any other witness is not voluntary in the same sense even
if the witness decides to testify on his or her own volition. In this case,
the accused was statutorily compellable to give evidence on examination
for discovery and therefore his evidence was compelled. Whether the
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accused freely decided to attend the discovery proceeding was irrelevant
to this conclusion.
However, in dissent, LeBel J. held that the distinction between using
prior compelled testimony to impeach credibility and using it to incriminate the accused was unworkable and that there can be no such
distinction in practice in the context of section 13. The distinction was
abandoned in the recent, unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in
R. v. Henry and it should not be reintroduced. It was true that section 13
sometimes operates to protect accused persons from impeachment by
their prior testimony even when they have given conflicting testimony or
there is evidence that they have lied under oath. Laying criminal charges
for perjury was the appropriate way to deal with witnesses who tailor
their evidence to suit their needs in each particular proceeding.
The majority’s approach to section 13 would require courts to conduct voir dires to determine whether the statements of an accused are
“innocent” or “incriminating”, which will encumber the trial process and
render section 13 dubious in theory and uncertain in practice. Uncertainty about how evidence might be used in future proceedings would
discourage witness candour and reduce the scope of section 13 protection
for previously compelled witnesses.
3. Comment
The new Nedelcu definition of incrimination for section 13 protection turning on the nature rather than the use of the evidence seems
contrived and unstable. If the Crown is introducing evidence as in
Nedelcu that the accused previously said he remembered nothing and
now he remembers everything in detail, the purpose is, of course, to cast
doubt on credibility and indirectly to admit the evidence to incriminate.
The unanimous Court in Henry may not have expressly ruled on this issue52 but Binnie J. clearly stated that the distinction between evidence
that incriminated and evidence that went to credibility had proved difficult to draw in this context and should be avoided. This position was
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision long ago in R. v. Piché53 that
it was wise to avoid any attempt to distinguish between inculpatory and
exculpatory statements for the purposes of the voluntary confession rule.

52
53

See Dufraimont, supra, note 50.
[1970] S.C.J. No. 59, [1971] S.C.R. 23 (S.C.C.).
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Given Nedelcu, it is to say the least ironic that McLachlin C.J.C. for
the Court in Sriskandarajah v. United States of America; Nadarajah v.
United States of America54 relies on Henry for only rejecting prior precedent in exceptional cases. The Court was not prepared to change its
previous jurisprudence on extradition. The Court held that extradition does
not violate the right of citizens to remain in Canada under section 6(1) of
the Charter, even when the foreign state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or
when there is a realistic possibility of prosecuting in Canada. To hold
otherwise would amount to overruling three previous decisions of the
Court. The Court, said the Chief Justice, does not lightly depart from the
law set out in the precedents:
Adherence to precedent has long animated the common law. … It is an
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points
come again in litigation. … The rule of precedent, or stare decisis,
promotes predictability, reduces arbitrariness, and enhances fairness, by
treating like cases alike. Exceptionally, this Court had recognized that it
may depart from its prior decisions if there are compelling reasons to
do so: R. v. Henry. … The benefits must outweigh the costs. For
instance, compelling reasons will be found when a precedent has
become unworkable, when its validity has been undermined by
subsequent jurisprudence or when it has been decided on the basis of
considerations that are no longer relevant.55

There was no such justification offered in Nedelcu for departing from
Henry. As the minority pointed out, the majority provide no compelling
reasons for reversing that recent bright line decision widely supported by
judges and commentators.
The courts will now be faced with difficult section 13 voir dires trying to apply the Nedelcu distinction. The guarantee against use immunity
has been substantially weakened.
There now appears to be more protection available in invoking the
protection of section 5(2)) of the Canada Evidence Act. However, the
witness and/or counsel will have to know enough to assert this protection. It is not automatic as was section 13 of the Charter as interpreted in
Henry.

54
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[2012] S.C.J. No. 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.).
Id., at paras. 18-19.
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VII. JUDICIAL NOTICE
R. v. Spence56 should be the controlling authority on judicial notice.
Justice Binnie for a unanimous Court, including McLachlin C.J.C., was
at pains to establish principles upon which all issues of judicial notice are
to be based. The Court is cautious. The closer any matter is to the dispositive fact, the less scope there is to be for judicial notice. If the matter
relates to adjudicative issues the strict Morgan “gold standard” set out by
McLachlin C.J.C. in R. v. Find57 is to be applied. For judicial notice the
facts have to be “(1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the
subject of debate among reasonable people; or (2) capable of immediate
and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy”.58
When it comes to social or legislative facts the Court opens the door
a little wider. However, a judge must still ask whether the alleged fact
would be accepted by a reasonably informed reasonable person as not
subject to reasonable dispute. Justice Binnie expresses a preference for
social science evidence to be presented by experts subject to crossexamination.
In R. v. A. (D.I.)59 the Court was interpreting the competency provision in section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act which allows adult
witnesses with a low mental age to testify if they cannot understand an
oath or solemn affirmation but can communicate and if they promise to
tell the truth. The Chief Justice for the majority decided that there is to be
no abstract inquiry into the person’s understanding of truth or the nature
of a promise. The majority applies the empirical research and recommendations of Professor Nick Bala respecting competency hearings for
young children which had directly resulted in Parliament enacting a new
and separate section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act. The majority
chose not to address Binnie J.’s strong and detailed dissenting complaint
in A. (D.I.) that this completely ignored judicial notice tests. There was
indeed no evidence before the Court of any research involving mentally
challenged adults.

56
57
58
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[2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 (S.C.C.).
[2001] S.C.J. No. 34, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 48.
Supra, note 7.
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In contrast, in R. v. S. (N.)60 McLachlin C.J.C., again speaking for
the majority, confronted the issue of whether a complainant in a sexual
assault trial should be required to remove her niqab (Muslim veil) for
cross-examination. She refuses to consider social science evidence of
interveners that cast doubt on whether assessing demeanour is a reliable
way to assess credibility. The Chief Justice is blunt and dismissive:
The only evidence in the record is a four-page unpublished review
article suggesting that untrained individuals cannot accurately detect
lies based on the speaker’s facial cues. This material was not tendered
through an expert available for cross-examination, Intervenors have
submitted articles for or against a connection, but they are not part of
the record and not supported by expert witnesses, and so are more
rhetorical than factual.61

VIII. CONCLUSION
It is a tall order to expect a Court of nine hard-working and expert
jurists with a mind-boggling docket to always achieve consensus, clarity
and consistency. These recent decisions, however, raise concerns that go
to the legitimacy of the rule of law. And there are few signs that the
Supreme Court is properly protecting the Charter rights of accused.

60
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Supra, note 8.
Id., at para. 20.

